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INTRODUCTION

The continuing confusion over the application and effect of
§ 11131 of the Bankruptcy Code, 2 which governs rejection of collective bargaining agreements in chapter 11 cases,3 was recently
highlighted in a trio of rapid-fire decisions by the Bankruptcy
5
Court4 and District Court for the Southern District of New York
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit' in
In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc. (MNI), the chapter 11 proceeding
involving the tabloid newspaper, the New York Daily News (Daily
News).
The Second Circuit ultimately adopted a functional approach to defining the "good cause" requirement of § 1113' and
required the debtor in possession (the Debtor) to hold its last
offer of modification open as a condition to approving rejection
of its collective bargaining agreement with one of its unions.'
Although the immediate result of the litigation was to save one of
New York City's most venerable institutions, the longer range
I

11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1988).

See infra note 20 for the text of the relevant por-

tions of § 1113. Section 1113 was enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984)

(BAFJA). A full discussion of BAFJA, which included important jurisdictional provisions, is beyond the scope of this Article.
2 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988). The Bankruptcy Code was originally enacted
as Title I of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549

(1978).
3 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1146. Section 1113 does not apply, however, in rail-

road reorganization cases. Id. § 1113(a).
4 In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 146 B.R. 920 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part
and aff'd in part, 149 B.R. 334 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 981 F.2d 85

(2d Cir. 1992).
5 In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 149 B.R. 334 (S.D.N.Y.), rev d in part and aff'd
in part, 981 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992).
6 In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 981 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992).
7 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(c)(2). For the text of § 11 13(c)(2), see infra note 20.
8 In re Maxwell Newspapers, 981 F.2d at 90-92.
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implications may well wreak havoc with the negotiating process
under § 1113.9
This Article contains reflections of counsel to the Debtor
about the practical difficulties that may result from the MNI decisions. With the era of failed leveraged buyouts now history, the
next wave of restructurings - both in bankruptcy and through
out-of-court workouts - is likely to focus in large part on the
excessive labor costs saddling many businesses.' 0 Even though
the problems confronting each company are to a certain extent
unique, the Debtor's experience provides a useful platform for
exploring the continued tension inherent in § 1113 between labor law and bankruptcy law principles - tension that any debtor
will necessarily confront if it attempts to restructure its labor
costs in chapter 11.
Congress enacted § 1113 in response to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco," which
9 See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.

10 The 1990s have already been witness to dramatic layoffs at companies

throughout the country, a downsizing trend which is likely to continue. See, e.g.,
FinancialExecutives Say Downsizing Will Continue, WALL ST.J., Feb. 26, 1993, at A16.
As technological improvements continue, still more jobs will be eliminated. See,
e.g., Amy Kaslow, Special Report: Jobs in the 90s-Beyond Guarantees, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONrrOR, March 24, 1993, Special Regent Section at 1;J.F. CHRONICLE, Oct.
29, 1992 at C1.
11 465 U.S. 513 (1984). In Bildisco, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a
collective bargaining agreement was an executory contract within the meaning of
§ 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 521-22. At the same time, the Court
concluded:
[B]ecause of the special nature of a collective-bargaining contract, and
the consequent 'law of the shop' which it creates . . . a somewhat
stricter standard [than the business judgment standard normally applicable to the rejection of executory contracts] should govern the decision of the Bankruptcy Court to allow rejection of a collectivebargaining agreement.
Id. at 524 (citation omitted). Thus, according to the Court, a collective bargaining
agreement could be rejected "if the debtor can show that the collective-bargaining
agreement burdens the estate, and that after careful scrutiny, the equities balance
in favor of rejecting the labor contract." Id. at 526. Rejection must be preceded by
"reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification . . . [but the] court need
not determine that the parties have bargained to impasse or make any other determination outside the field of its expertise." Id. at 526-27. In addition, a narrow 5-4
majority held that a debtor in possession did not commit an unfair labor practice if
it unilaterally rejected or modified a collective bargaining agreement before obtaining court approval. Id. at 527-34. While courts had generally permitted debtors to reject collective bargaining agreements prior to Bildisco, the Supreme Court's
decision settled conflicts between lower courts regarding the appropriate standard
and the effect of the debtor's implementation of unilateral changes before the
court-approved rejection. In re Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907, 908 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1984).
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upheld the right of a debtor to reject a collective bargaining
agreement and to implement changes in the terms and conditions of employment before court approval of rejection without
running afoul of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).12 It
is the thesis of this Article that § 1113 is a poorly conceived and
inartfully drafted statute that has failed to resolve this tension between the Bankruptcy Code and the NLRA.'" The absence of a
clearly defined standard for determining when the union has
good cause to reject the debtor's final proposal (a necessary ele12 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1973). See generally Douglas Bordewieck & Vern Countryman, The Rejection of Collective BargainingAgreements by Chapter 11 Debtors, 57 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 293, 317 (1983) (asserting that a court should carefully scrutinize the
debtor's justifications for rejection because the debtor is, in essence, seeking to
directly contravene the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)).
i The Second Circuit has noted that Bildisco "sparked intense congressional debate" concerning the ability of a debtor in possession or trustee to reject a collective bargaining agreement in bankruptcy. See Century Brass Prods., Inc. v. Int'l
Union, United Auto. Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers (In re Century Brass
Products, Inc.), 795 F.2d 265, 266 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986). This
debate represented an "institutional tension between labor and bankruptcy law"
because a debtor could unilaterally reject a contract under bankruptcy law, but such
rejection, if attempted on a collective bargaining agreement, would "flaunt[] national labor policy." Id. Congressional reaction was swift, and § 1113 was signed
into law on July 10, 1984, less than five months after the Bildisco decision. Id. at
266-67. See also Bruce H. Charnov, The Uses and Misuses of the Legislative History of
Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 925, 946-54 (1989) (chronicling congressional reaction to Bildisco); Rosalind Rosenberg, Bankruptcy and the Collective BargainingAgreement - A Brief Lesson in the Use of the Constitutional System of
Checks and Balances, 58 AM. BANKS. L.J. 293, 313 (1984) (noting organized labor's
support for undoing the Bildisco decision). To put it charitably, "§ 1113 is not a
masterpiece of draftsmanship," and courts and commentators have struggled with
it ever since its enactment. In re Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 909. Indeed, § 1113
has inspired a virtual avalanche of scholarly publications attempting to divine its
true meaning and Congress's intent. See, e.g., Hon. Joseph L. Cosetti & Stanley A.
Kirshenbaum, Rejecting Collective BargainingAgreements Under Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code -Judicial Precisionor Economic Reality?, 26 DuQ. L. REV. 181 (1987); Carlos J. Cuevas, Necessary Modifications and Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Search
for the Substantive Standardfor Modification of a Collective BargainingAgreement in a Corporate Reorganization, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1990); B. Glenn George, Collective Bargaining in Chapter 11 and Beyond, 95 YALE L.J. 300 (1985); Richard H. Gibson, The
New Law on Rejection of Collective BargainingAgreements in Chapter 11: An Analysis of 11
U.S.C. § 1113, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325 (1984); Anne J. McClain, Bankruptcy Code
Section 1113 and the Simple Rejection of Collective BargainingAgreements: Labor Loses
Again, 80 GEO. L.J. 191 (1991); Mitchell Rait, Rejection of Collective BargainingAgreements Under Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Second Circuit Enters the Arena, 63
AM. BANKR. L.J. 355 (1989); Martha S. West, Life After Bildisco: Section 1113 and the
Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 47 OHIo STATE L.J. 65 (1986); Jeffrey W. Berkman,
Note, Nobody Likes Rejection Unless You're a Debtor in Chapter 11: Rejection of Collective
BargainingAgreements Under 11 U.S.C. § 1113, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 169 (1989);
Peter B. Brandow, Note, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Bankruptcy:
Finding a Balance in 11 U.S.C. § 1113, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233 (1988).
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ment for rejection),' 4 as well as the Second Circuit's requirement
that the debtor hold open its last offer to the union following
rejection, will foster continued litigation rather than the consensual resolutions that Congress intended. 15 Accordingly, this Article contains specific suggestions for changes to § 1113 and its
interpretation that are intended to re-focus § 1113 towards the
goal of rehabilitating distressed companies on a consensual basis.
1113
Section 1113 provides strict procedural and substantive requirements that a debtor must meet to reject a collective bargaining agreement. Section 1113 is in sharp contrast to § 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code,' 6 which governs the assumption and rejection
of all other executory contracts. Section 365 places little, if any,
7
constraint on the ability of the trustee or debtor in possession'
to reject burdensome executory contracts. Although § 365 reII.

SECTION

quires court approval of a debtor's decision to reject,'

8

courts

will generally defer to the debtor's business judgment when considering a motion to authorize rejection. 19
Section 1113,20 on the other hand, departs from the business
14 See infra notes 88-118 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
16 11 U.S.C. § 365. Section 365 provides in relevant part: "Except as provided
in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor." Id. § 365(a). Upon rejection, a
debtor in possession is freed of any ongoing post-petition obligation to the
nondebtor party, which is simply left with a claim for rejection damages. Pursuant
to § 5 02(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, this claim is deemed to have arisen prepetition, notwithstanding the fact that rejection by definition occurs post-petition. Id.
§ 5 0 2(g).
17 Section 1107(a) of the Bankruptcy Code gives a debtor in possession essentially the same rights and powers as a trustee. II U.S.C. § 1107(a).
18- Id. § 365(a).
19 See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 523 (1984) (noting that
ordinary rejection of executory contracts is governed by the "business judgment
standard"); In re Structurlite Plastics Corp., 86 B.R. 922, 925 n.4 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1988) (same); In re FCX, Inc., 60 B.R. 405, 411 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986) (same); In re
Anglo Energy, Ltd., 41 B.R. 337, 340 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (same); Nat'l Sugar
Ref. Co. v. Stroehmann Bros. Co. (In re Nat'l Sugar Ref. Co.), 26 B.R. 765, 767
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same).
20 Section 1113 provides in pertinent part:
(a) The debtor in possession, or the trustee if one has been appointed under the provisions of this chapter, other than a trustee in a
case covered by subchapter IV of this chapter and by title I of the
Railway Labor Act, may assume or reject a collective bargaining
agreement only in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(b)(1) Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to filing an applica-
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judgment standard and instead adopts "a compromise approach" between labor law and bankruptcy principles.21 Section
1113 thus establishes procedural and substantive requirements
that must be met prior to rejection.2 2
There are two procedural requirements for rejection: first,
§ 1113(b)(1) requires that the debtor's proposal to the union include the type of relevant and dependable information necessary
to assess such a proposal; second, § 11 13(b)(2) provides that bargaining between the debtor and the union must be in good
23
faith.
There are also three substantive requirements for rejection:
tion seeking rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor
in possession or trustee (hereinafter in this section "trustee" shall include a debtor in possession), shall - (A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees covered by such agreement,
based on the most complete and reliable information available at the
time of such proposal, which provides for those necessary modifications in the employees benefits and protections that are necessary to
permit the reorganization of the debtor and assures that all creditors,
the debtor and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably; and (B) provide, subject to subsection (d)(3), the representative
of the employees with such relevant information as is necessary to
evaluate the proposal.
(2) During the period beginning on the date of the making of a proposal provided for in paragraph (1) and ending on the date of the
hearing provided for in subsection (d)(1), the trustee shall meet, at
reasonable times, with the authorized representative to confer in
good faith in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications
of such agreement.
(c) The court shall approve an application for rejection of a collective bargaining agreement only if the court finds that - (1) the trustee
has, prior to the hearing, made a proposal that fulfills the requirements of subsection (b)(1); (2) the authorized representative of the
employees has refused to accept such proposal without good cause;
and (3) the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of such
agreement.
(f) No provision of this title shall be construed to permit a trustee to
unilaterally terminate or alter any provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement prior to compliance with the provisions of this section.
11 U.S.C. §§ 1113(a), (b), (c), (f).
21 Century Brass Prods., Inc. v. Int'l Union, Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers, 795 F.2d 265, 266 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 949 (1986).
22 Id. Section 1113 also provides that emergency, temporary modification of a
collective bargaining agreement may be granted to the debtor without meeting the
requirements for rejection set forth in subsections (b) and (c). 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e).
Such emergency relief is, however, much more difficult to obtain; it is available only
"if essential to the continuation of the debtor's business, or in order to avoid irreparable damage to the estate." Id. Issues relating to the interpretation of subsection
(e) are beyond the scope of this Article.
23 Century Brass, 795 F.2d at 273.
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first, the debtor's proposal must satisfy the requirements of
§ 1113(b)(l), under § 1113(c)(1); second, the union's rejection
of the proposal must lack good cause, under § 1113(c)(2); and
finally, under § I1 13(c)(3), rejection of the proposal must be favored after a "balance of the equities" examination.2 4
For ease of analysis in assessing motions to reject, most
bankruptcy courts have used a nine-part test that the bankruptcy
court in In re American Provision Co.2 5 adopted shortly after the enactment of § 1113.26 The nine factors are:
(1) The debtor in possession must make a proposal to the
Union to modify the collective bargaining agreement; (2) The
proposal must be based on the most complete and reliable information available at the time of the proposal; (3) The proposed modifications must be necessary to permit the
reorganization of the debtor; (4) The proposed modifications
must assure that all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected
parties are treated fairly and equitably; (5) The debtor must
provide to the union such relevant information as is necessary
to evaluate the proposal; (6) Between the time of the making
of the proposal and the time of the hearing on approval of the
rejection of the existing collective bargaining agreement, the
debtor must meet at reasonable times with the Union; (7) At
the meetings the debtor must confer in good faith in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications of the collective bargaining agreement; (8) The Union must have refused
to accept the proposal without good cause; and (9) The balfavor rejection of the collecance of the equities must clearly
27
tive bargaining agreement.
Id. (citing Gibson, supra note 13, at 335).
44 B.R. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
26 Id. at 909. See also In re Valley Steel Prods. Co., 142 B.R. 337, 340 (Bankr.
E.D. Mo. 1992) (noting that the nine-part test is "now widely accepted"). For various courts' application of this nine-part test, see In re GCI, Inc., 131 B.R. 685, 69091 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991); In re Big Sky Transp. Co., 104 B.R. 333, 335 (Bankr. D.
Mon. 1989); In re Texas Sheet Metals, Inc., 90 B.R. 260, 263 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1988); In re Amherst Sparkle Mkt., Inc., 75 B.R. 847, 849 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987);
In re Walway Co., 69 B.R. 967, 972 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); In re Kentucky Truck
Sales, Inc., 52 B.R. 797, 800 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985); In re Salt Creek Freightways,
47 B.R. 835, 837-38 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
27 In re Am. Provision, 44 B.R. at 909. While the interpretation of all of these
requirements is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that there is a
major and important split in the circuits concerning the interpretation of the "necessary to the reorganization" language. The Third Circuit has construed this language "strictly to signify only those modifications that the trustee is constrained to
accept because they are directly related to the Company's financial condition and
its reorganization." Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of
Am., 791 F.2d 1074, 1088 (3d Cir. 1988). Moreover, the Third Circuit requires
24

25
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The courts within the Second Circuit have not, however, formally adopted this test. In 1985 the Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York noted in In re Carey Transportation,
Inc. ,28 that the nine-part test provided a "convenient framework" for
analysis.2 9 But, the same court in 1986 stated in In re Royal Composing Room, Inc."° that "[t]his court eschews the talismanic nine-step
analysis .... Instead, this court looks to the three interdependent
findings required by Code § 1113(c)."'"
The bankruptcy court in the MNI case seemed to follow this
latter approach. Thus, after addressing a variety of objections to
rejection that the New York Typographical Union No. 6 (Local 6)
raised, the bankruptcy court sought to determine whether the
debtor satisfied the three requisite showings needed to support rejection. 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed, stating that "[r]ejection of a collective bargaining
agreement is permitted only if the debtor fulfills the requirements of
§ 111 3(b)(1), the union fails to reject the debtor's proposal with
good cause, and the balance of the equities clearly favors
33
rejection."1
that the proposed modifications be necessary to the "short[] term goal of preventing the debtor's liquidation." Id. at 1089. The Second and Tenth Circuits have
adopted a less stringent interpretation. In the view of these courts, "necessary"
does not mean absolutely minimal or essential changes, although it does mean
more than just helpful changes. See Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Mile Hi
Metal Sys., Inc. (In re Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc.), 899 F.2d 887, 893 (10th Cir. 1990);
Truck Drivers Local 807, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Carey Transp., Inc.,
816 F.2d 82, 88-90 (2d Cir. 1987). The focus is not on short term survival but on a
successful reorganization. Id. See generally Chamov, supra note 13, at 984-1003.
28 50 B.R. 203 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd sub nom. Truck Drivers Local 807,
Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Carey Transp., 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1987).
29 Id. at 207.
30 In re Royal Composing Room, Inc., 62 B.R. 403 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd,
78 B.R. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 848 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1078 (1989).
31 Id. at 406.
32 In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 146 B.R. 920, 928 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in
part and aff'd in part, 149 B.R. 334 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 981 F.2d
85 (2d Cir. 1992).
33 In re Maxwell Newspapers, 981 F.2d at 89 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 11 13(c)(1)-(3)).
The Second Circuit omitted any mention of § 1113(b)(2), which requires the
debtor to meet with the union in an effort to reach a consensual resolution. The
Second Circuit acknowledged that the statute required good faith negotiations between the parties, but reasoned that "[t]his obligation is properly analyzed under
§ 11 13(c)(2), which permits rejection of a labor agreement only when the union has
rejected the debtor's proposal without good cause." Id. (citing In re Royal Composing
Room, 848 F.2d at 349). As discussed in detail below, the Second Circuit's conception of good cause incorporates the situation where the debtor failed to comply
with § 11 13(b)(2), or has only "gone through the motions" and offered proposals
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MNI DECISIONS

The Bankruptcy Court Decision
1.

The Onerous Lifetime Guarantees

From the inception of the Debtor's chapter 11 case, virtually
all parties recognized that a sale of the Daily News was essential to
the Debtor's successful reorganization. 3 4 While the Debtor had
approximately $8 million in cash when it filed for relief under
chapter 11, cumulative losses over the previous decade of more
than $100 million, plus estimated net losses of approximately
$7.2 million for 1992, left the Debtor in an extremely weakened
position.3 5
A potentially fatal impediment to a sale, however, was the
Debtor's onerous collective bargaining agreement with Local 6,
which represented the Debtor's typographers. 36 Part of the collective bargaining agreement was a so-called "special agreement," originally entered into in 1974, that provided for lifetime
job guarantees for members of Local 6 then employed by the
Debtor. The consideration for this special agreement was Local
6's consent to permit automation of the functions performed by
typographers.3 7 A successors and assigns clause in the Local 6
collective bargaining agreement purported to provide that this
lifetime job guarantee would bind any successor or assign of the
Debtor.38 By the end of 1992, the Debtor still employed 167 tyin bad faith. Id. at 90; see infra notes 94-123 and accompanying text (suggesting that
subsuming the good faith bargaining requirement within the good cause requirement is erroneous, and, instead, the good cause requirement needlessly diverts the
court's focus from the reorganization process, and therefore should be eliminated).
34 In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 146 B.R. at 923, 931. On December 5, 1991, the
Debtor filed for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. While the immediate cause of the Debtor's bankruptcy filing was the death of its owner, Robert
Maxwell, and the loss of his continued financial support for the Debtor's operations, the Debtor's excessive labor costs and its weakened condition from a bitter
1990 strike made an eventual filing inevitable. Id. at 922-23.
35 Id. at 923.
36 Id. at 923-24.
37 In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 149 B.R. 334, 336 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part and
aff'd in part, 981 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992); see also NLRB v. New York Typographical

Union, 632 F.2d 171, 174 n.3 (2d Cir. 1980) (summarizing history of the special
agreement).
38 The collective bargaining agreement's successors and assigns clause provided, in pertinent part:
2. The employment guarantees and discharge provision of this Special Agreement, including the survival of such employment guarantees and discharge provision beyond the expiration of this Special
Agreement and the Contract, shall enure to the successors and/or as-
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pographers,3 9 at an annual cost of approximately $9.3 million,4 °
even though technological developments had effectively rendered the typographers' craft largely obsolete.4 '
Not surprisingly, none of the potential purchasers of the
newspaper was willing to assume the Local 6 collective bargaining agreement. 4 2 The Debtor, however, ultimately reached an
agreement to sell the newspaper to an entity controlled by Mortimer Zuckerman. 4 3 He, too, was unwilling to assume the collective bargaining agreement with Local 6 and its lifetime job

guarantees.44
Local 6 reacted to the Debtor's efforts to sell the newspaper
by commencing an adversary proceeding 45 against the Debtor
seeking, inter alia, to compel arbitration on its claim that the
Debtor's sales efforts violated the successors and assigns clause
of the collective bargaining agreement by failing to condition any
sale on assumption of the lifetime job guarantees.4 6 Local 6 also
asserted that § 1113 was simply inapplicable in the sale context.4 7
signs of any Publisher signatory to this Special Agreement as if such
successor or assign had been an original signatory thereto.
3. Only in the event of a permanent suspension of the Publisher's
newspaper will the employment guarantees of this Special Agreement
cease.
New York Typographical Union-PublisherProductivity and Job Security Special Agreement,
Article 1(F), in CONTRACT AND SCALE OF PRICES, NEWSPAPER BRANCH, NEW YORK,
TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION No. 6, at 69 (amended Mar. 31, 1984) (on file with the SETON HALL LAW REVIEW).

39 In re Maxwell Newspapers, 146 B.R. at 923.
40 Id. at 924.
41 Id. at 923-24.
42 Id. at 924.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 According to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, a proceeding for
injunctive relief constitutes an adversarial proceeding. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001.
These proceedings are similar to normal civil actions and are commenced by service of a summons and complaint. Id. 7003. Contested matters, on the other hand,
are commenced by notice of motion. Id. 9014. A motion to reject a collective bargaining agreement pursuant to § 1113 is a contested matter. In re Salt Creek
Freightways, 47 B.R. 835, 837 n.1 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
46 Complaint, New York Typographical Union No. 6 v. Maxwell Newspapers,
Inc. d/b/a Daily News, Adv. Proc. No. 92-9552A (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
47 Local 6 apparently assumed that if § 1113 was inapplicable in the context of a
sale, the Debtor would have no mechanism to reject the collective bargaining
agreement. This does not logically follow; it is equally plausible that if the rejection
provisions of § 1113 were inapplicable, the prohibition against rejection of
§ 1113(a), other than in compliance with the procedures provided for in §§ 1113(b)
and (c), would also be inapplicable. Presumably, under such a scenario, rejection
would then be available under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, subject to the standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Bildisco.
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Prior to the filing of the § 1113 motion, the bankruptcy court rejected Local 6's position, holding that § 1113 applied in the context of a debtor that attempted to reorganize by means of a sale
of its business.48
2. The Bargaining Process
On October 1, 1992, the Debtor made an initial proposal to
Local 6 to modify the collective bargaining agreement. This proposal essentially called for the elimination of the lifetime job
guarantees contained in the collective bargaining agreement.49
Local 6 rejected this proposal and ultimately made a counterproposal that provided for a gradual reduction in the number of
"shifts" that the purchaser would be required to offer Local 6's
members each week. In return, however, Local 6's members
would receive an incentive in the form of a cash buyout offer and
a contribution to its pension and welfare funds.50 Although the
buyout component of this proposal was unacceptable to the
Debtor and Zuckerman, the concept of a reduction in shifts
formed the basis for all subsequent proposals. 51
The Debtor and Zuckerman responded with a counterproposal that accelerated the shift reductions.52 While this proposal
48 In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., Adv. Proc. No. 92-9552A, Hearing Transcript
at 56-57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 1992). The bankruptcy court reasoned that, given
the strong policy in favor of rehabilitating debtors and Congress's determination
that rejection of collective bargaining agreements could be utilized to further that
goal, a chapter 11 debtor could utilize pertinent provisions of chapter 11, even
when planning to sell most of its assets, provided it seeks to change and maintain
operations, rather than cease and liquidate operations. Id. at 54. The Bankruptcy
Judge stated:
This is not a true liquidation in the sense that Local 6 seeks to
convey.
Under the terms of the proposed sale the newspaper will continue to operate rather than shut down, resulting in the preservation
of the jobs of approximately 2,000 employees, a critical consideration
in the face of our economy.
Although substantially all of the newspapers's assets would be
sold, the only true change will be the ownership of the paper, a
change that will ideally preserve jobs and benefit the estate.
Id. at 56.
49 In re Maxwell Newspapers, 146 B.R. at 925. This proposal also called for the
elimination of the successors and assigns clause and any duty to arbitrate regarding
the lifetime job guarantees. Id.
50 Id. at 926.
51 Id. at 926-27. Because Zuckerman, as the potential purchaser, would necessarily fund any settlement, he was deeply involved in the negotiations with Local 6.
The bankruptcy court found that this participation was consistent with the purposes
of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 929.
52 In re Maxwell Newspapers, 146 B.R. at 926.
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omitted any buyout or contributions to Local 6's welfare and
pension funds, it provided an early retirement incentive by adding five years to an employee's age and length of service for
calculating retirement eligibility and benefits (the "5 + 5" early
retirement program).5 ' Local 6's response increased the rate of
shift reductions, but at the cost of a "6 + 6" early retirement
program, plus a cash payment of $10,000 for each retiring employee.54 Zuckerman subsequently concluded that the cost of
either a "5 + 5" or "6 + 6" was impossible to quantify and
dropped this element from his final proposal, which was delivered to Local 6 late in the evening preceding the § 1113 hearing.5 5 The final proposal did provide, however, for an immediate
cash payment of $1 million to Local 6's health and welfare fund
to provide health insurance coverage for the Local 6 employees. 56 Local 6 rejected this final proposal, asserting that it did
not meet Local 6's earlier proposals 57 and that it was made too
late in the evening before the hearing on the rejection motion for
it to make a meaningful response. 8
3.

The Bankruptcy Court Rulings

The bankruptcy court held a hearing on the Debtor's motion
to reject the collective bargaining agreement on October 22 and
23, 1992. After rejecting Local 6's threshold arguments in opposition to the Debtor's motion to reject the collective bargaining
agreement,59 the bankruptcy court turned to whether the Debtor
53 Id.
54 Id.

Id. at 926-27.
Id. at 927. The cost of this final proposal to Zuckerman was $30 million. Id.
Fred Drasner, Zuckerman's chief negotiator, testified that he estimated that the
jobs of all of Local 6's members could be eliminated for a capital investment of
between $1.5 and $2.0 million. Id. at 930.
57 Id. at 927.
58 In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 149 B.R. 334, 341 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part and
aff'd in part, 981 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992). Significantly, Local 6 did not raise the
timing issue below in the bankruptcy court but only in the district court.
59 In the first threshold point, Local 6 argued that rejection was impermissible
because the Daily News allegedly sought a " 'retroactive modification' of the [Daily
News's] alleged breach in agreeing to a sale [of the newspaper] without honoring
the lifetime job guarantees." In re Maxwell Newspapers, 146 B.R. at 928. The bankruptcy court dismissed this argument on the facts, holding that the Daily News did
not breach the collective bargaining agreement by entering into an agreement to
sell the newspaper because such an agreement was not binding on the Daily News
absent bankruptcy court approval. Id. The bankruptcy court went on to note that
"even if there had been a breach, nothing in the language of section 1113 suggests
that a debtor cannot reject a collective bargaining agreement if it has breached that
55
56
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had fulfilled the three substantive requirements imposed by
§ 1113. First, the bankruptcy court examined whether the
Debtor had made a post-petition, pre-motion proposal that complied with § 11 13(b)(1). Consistent with the majority of earlier
cases addressing the issue, the bankruptcy court construed this
requirement as meaning that "[t]he debtor must show that its
pre-rejection proposal was made in good faith and contains necessary, but not absolutely minimal, changes that will enable the
debtor to complete the reorganization process successfully." 6 °
The bankruptcy court had little difficulty concluding that the
Debtor and Zuckerman had acted in good faith, given the extensive bargaining that occurred from the time of the initial propoagreement so long as the debtor has negotiated in good faith." Id. (citing In re GCI,
Inc., 131 B.R. 685, 694-97 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991)). See also In re Alabama Symphony Assoc., 155 B.R. 556, 571 (Bankr. N.D. 1993) (debtor's breach of collective
bargaining agreement does not preclude subsequent rejection).
Second, Local 6 argued that rejection should be denied on the theory that the
Daily News's initial proposal improperly sought the termination of the collective bargaining agreement and that the Daily News had therefore failed to comply with
§ 11 13(b)(1)(A)'s requirement that the debtor make a pre-application proposal
containing necessary modifications to the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 92829. The bankruptcy court dismissed this argument, noting that the Daily News's
proposal, while harsh, left many provisions of the collective bargaining agreement
intact and therefore constituted a proposal to modify, not terminate, the collective
bargaining agreement. Id. at 929. Moreover, the bankruptcy court held that, in any
event, rejection may be granted even if the initial pre-application proposal is defective, so long as "the debtor has 'prior to the hearing' made a proposal that fulfills
the requirements of subsection (b)(1). Id. The bankruptcy court further noted that
it could consider pre-hearing proposals irrespective of whether the pre-application
proposal was not a model proposal for section 1113 purposes." Id. (citing In re
Royal Composing Room, Inc., 62 B.R. 403, 407 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), aft'd, 848
F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989); In re Allied Delivery Sys.
Co., 49 B.R. 700, 703 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985)).
Local 6's third threshold objection was that the explicit reference in § 1113 to
the trustee or the debtor precluded the bankruptcy court from considering the prospective purchaser's proposal to Local 6. Id. at 929. The bankruptcy court rejected
this argument, holding that it was a necessary corollary of its earlier holding that
the purchaser's needs - and therefore the purchaser's proposals - be considered
in evaluating a motion to reject a collective bargaining agreement under § 1113.
Id. The bankruptcy court also rejected as "senseless" Local 6's related argument
that the determination of whether the proposed modifications were "necessary"
within the meaning of § 11 13(b)(l)(A) should be determined by reference to the
purchaser's wealth. Id. at 929-30. As the bankruptcy court correctly pointed out,
"[t]hat there are wealthy suitors for an ailing debtor's business matters little if those
suitors will not marry the debtor because of the economic handcuffs which the
debtor wears." Id. at 930.
60 Id. (citing In re Royal Composing Room, 848 F.2d at 348). See supra note 27 for a
discussion of the different standards regarding the meaning of "necessary" in this
context.
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sal through the date of the hearing. 6 '
Second, the bankruptcy court considered whether Local 6
had rejected the final proposal to modify the collective bargaining agreement without good cause. The bankruptcy court dismissed Local 6's argument that the good cause requirement
merely required the union to articulate a rational reason for rejecting the proposal. 62 After noting that courts have had difficulty in determining precisely what good cause means, 63 the
bankruptcy court offered its own elucidation of this issue:
Although some courts have suggested that good cause to reject the proposal cannot exist if the debtor shows that it bargained in good faith, that the proposed modifications are
necessary, and that they are fair and equitable, the Second Circuit has rejected that standard except where the union has
neither participated meaningfully in post-petition negotiations
nor offered any reason for rejecting the proposal other than its
view that the proposed modifications were excessive ....
Manifestly, Local 6 bargained hard here. It would seem that a
union may safely refuse the debtor's proposal if its members
are being unfairly burdened relative to the other parties or the
proposal is not necessary for the debtor's reorganization, but,
otherwise, the union cannot safely turn down the proposal if it
has not proffered an alternative which accomplishes the same
economic end and fulfills the needs of the reorganization.'
Applying this somewhat diaphanous "reorganization" standard,
the bankruptcy court concluded that Local 6 in fact lacked good
cause to reject the debtor's final proposal to modify the collective
bargaining agreement. The bankruptcy court acknowledged that
Local 6 "was caught off guard by the final proposal."-65 The court
nonetheless concluded that Local 6's failure to offer an alternative
proposal that "would accomplish the same economic result ' 66 as
Zuckerman's final proposal, and its insistence "that the excess employees be given a sweetener to induce them to leave," '67 did not
constitute good cause. This conclusion was buttressed by the fact
61 In re Maxwell Newspapers, 146 B.R. at 930. See also In re Sol-Sieff Produce Co.,

82 B.R. 787, 795 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) (finding good faith where debtor "has at
all times been ready, willing, and able to negotiate these issues").
62 In re Maxwell Newspapers, 146 B.R. at 933.
63 Id. at 932. See infra notes 91-118 and accompanying text (discussing various
formulations of good cause standard).
64 Id. at 932 (citing Truck Drivers Local 807, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Carey Transp., 816 F.2d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 1987)).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 933.
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that Zuckerman offered a gradual phase-out ofjobs likely to become
obsolete in the very short term.68
Third, the bankruptcy court concluded that the Debtor had established the final substantive requirement: the balance of the equities clearly favored rejection, because "without the relief sought, the
[Debtor] is doomed and chapter 7 looms large." 6 9 Having found
that the Debtor had complied with § 1113, the bankruptcy court
granted the Debtor's motion to reject the collective bargaining

agreement.7 °
B.

The District Court Decision

Local 6 immediately appealed to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York and sought a stay of
the closing of the sale pending appeal. The request for a stay was
denied, but the appeal was expedited, briefed, argued and decided in a matter of a few weeks. 7' The district court affirmed the
bankruptcy court's conclusion that § 1113 applied in the sale
context as well as the order approving the sale of the newspaper.72 The district court, however, reversed the decision to permit rejection on the narrow ground that Local 6 had good cause
to reject the final proposal to modify the collective bargaining
agreement.
Focusing exclusively on the second half of the bankruptcy
court's articulation of the "good cause" standard, the district
court concluded that the bankruptcy court had construed
§ 1113(c) (2) too narrowly and equated lack of good cause with
the debtor's making a proposal containing necessary modifications.73 The district court reasoned that under the bankruptcy
court's interpretation of § 11 13(c)(2), rejection of the collective
bargaining agreement would be required "in all cases except two:
where the union members are 'unfairly burdened relative to the
68 Id. The bankruptcy court also rejected Local 6's contentions that the original
proposal was not made in good faith and that its rejection of that proposal was
supported by good cause. Id. at 932. The court noted that Local 6's argument
failed to account for the later proposals. Id.
69
70

Id. at 934.

71

Id. at 336.

Id. The bankruptcy court then approved the Debtor's motion to approve the
sale of the newspaper to Zuckerman. In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 149 B.R. 334,
335 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 981 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id. at
motion for
trict court.
73 Id. at
72

337-38. Local 6 had also appealed the bankruptcy court's denial of its
appointment of an examiner. This order was also affirmed by the disId. at 341.
338-39.
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other parties' and where 'the proposal is necessary for the
debtor's reorganization.'

"

The district court concluded that

these two scenarios simply restated the requirements of
§§ 1113(b)(1)(A) and 1113(c)(1), and thus effectively read the
good cause requirement of § 11 13(c)(2) out of the statute. In the
district court's view, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit implicitly disavowed this construction of § 1112
in Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp.75
According to the district court, § 1113(c)(2) emphasizes the
bargaining process itself, and not solely the substance of the
debtor's proposal.7 6 Applying this "process" concept of good
cause, the district court concluded that Local 6 had good cause to
reject the final proposal, because it was made late in the evening
preceding the bankruptcy court hearing, and because it changed
certain aspects of the prior proposal. 77 The district court reasoned that the Debtor's proposal, which shifted directions at such
a late hour, left Local 6 with insufficient time to respond with a
meaningful counterproposal.78
C.

The Second Circuit Decision

After expedited appeals, and less than three weeks after the
district court ruling, the Second Circuit reversed the district
court on the good cause issue, holding that Local 6 lacked good
cause to reject the final proposal to modify the collective bargaining agreement. 79 Although not entirely clear from its opinion,
the Second Circuit appeared to agree with the district court's
finding that the bankruptcy court had read the good cause requirement too narrowly. 80 The Second Circuit, however, did not
attempt to define good cause as used in § 1113(c)(2), noting that
Id. at 339 (quoting In re Maxwell Newspapers, 146 B.R. at 932).
Id. (citing Truck Drivers Local 807, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Carey
Transp., 816 F.2d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 1987)).
76 In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 149 B.R. at 339. The district court acknowledged, but did not consider to be significant, the fact that Carey Transp. involved the
very different factual situation of a union that simply refused to bargain with the
debtor over proposed modifications to the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at
339 & n.3 (quoting Carey Transp., 816 F.2d at 92).
77 Id. at 340-41.
78 Id. at 341.
79 All other aspects of the district court's decision were affirmed. In re Maxwell
Newspapers, Inc., 981 F.2d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 1992).
80 Compare id. at 89 (apparently agreeing with the district court that the bankruptcy court misread § 1113(c)(2)) with id. at 90 (stating that "the bankruptcy court
perhaps took a too narrow view of § 1113(c)(2). . . . [w]hether or not the bankruptcy court may have misstated the good cause rule").
74
75
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its meaning must be ascertained on a case-by-case basis. 8 1 Instead, the Second Circuit adopted a more functional approach to
understanding what is meant by good cause:
A more constructive and perhaps more answerable inquiry is
why this term is in the statute. We think good cause serves as
an incentive to the debtor trying to have its labor contract
modified to propose in good faith only those changes necessary to its successful reorganization, while protecting it from
the union's refusal to accept the changes without a good
reason.
To that end, the entire thrust of § 1113 is to ensure that
well-informed and good faith negotiations occur in the market
place, not as part of the judicial process.... Knowing that it
cannot turn down an employer's proposal without good cause
gives the union an incentive to compromise on modifications
of the collective bargaining agreement, so as to prevent its
complete rejection ....
Thus, for example, a union will not have good cause to
reject an employer's proposal that contains only those modifications essential for the debtor's reorganization, that is, the
union's refusal to accept it will be held to be without good
cause. On the other hand, as we have noted, where the union
makes compromise proposals during the negotiating process
that meet its needs while preserving the debtor's savings, its
rejection of the debtor's proposal would be with good cause.82
While apparently disagreeing with the bankruptcy court's explanation of the good cause standard, the Second Circuit concurred
with its factual findings that other employee groups had already suffered far greater reductions than Local 6, that creditors would receive only a small return on their prepetition claims, that Local 6
nonetheless insisted on incentives for its members to voluntarily
surrender their guaranteed jobs and that neither the Debtor nor
Zuckerman could accede to this request.8 " The Second Circuit also
reversed the district court's assertion that the last-minute nature of
the final proposal was somehow unfair, thereby justifying the
union's rejection of the final proposal. In this regard, the circuit
court noted that ten hours during labor negotiations provided parties with sufficient time to contemplate and respond to an adversary's proposal.84
81
82
83

84

Id. at 90.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 90-91.
Id. at 91. This is also consistent with the text of § 1113, which contemplates
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Further, the Second Circuit considered the proposals and counterproposals that had been made after the commencement of the
original rejection hearing in the bankruptcy court.8 5 Indeed, the
Second Circuit invited a complete report about the most current status of the offers and counteroffers. This aspect of the decision implicitly rejected conflicting authority in the Second Circuit, as well as
a court of appeals decision outside the Second Circuit.8 6
Finally, and of special concern, the Second Circuit conditioned
its approval of the rejection of the Local 6 collective bargaining
agreement by requiring the debtor to hold open the last offer to
Local 6, which was made immediately before the Second Circuit oral
argument. Thus, the union was given one final chance to accept the
Debtor's last proposal even after the Second Circuit rendered the
87
decision.
IV.

PRACTICAL PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE
FUTURE SOLUTIONS

MNI DECISIONS:

The trio of MNI decisions raise two difficult theoretical and
practical questions regarding § 1113. First, as all three courts in
the MNI case correctly noted, cardinal principles of statutory
construction mandate that § 1113(c)(2)'s current requirement
that the union reject the final proposal without good cause be
given some independent meaning, rather than simply be construed as a redundant restatement of the requirements of
§§ 11 13(c)(1) and (3).88 The concept of good cause, however,
that negotiations, after the filing of a motion to reject, will proceed on a fast track.
Section 1113(d)(l) provides that the hearing on the debtor's motion to reject a
collective bargaining agreement must be scheduled within fourteen days of the filing of the motion. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(l).
85 In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 981 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1992).
86 See In re Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc., 899 F.2d 887, 893 (10th Cir. 1990) (refusing
to consider proposal made during rejection hearing); In re Royal Composing
Room, Inc., 62 B.R. 403, 407 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (same), aft'd, 78 B.R. 671
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 848 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1078 (1989). But see In re Kentucky Truck Sales, Inc., 52 B.R. 797, 800 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1985) (considering negotiations made during recess of rejection hearing).
It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile this part of the Second Circuit's decision with the plain language of § 1113. Section 1113(c)(1) expressly refers to a
proposal made by the debtor "prior to the hearing." 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(c)(1).
87 In re Maxwell Newspapers, 981 F.2d at 91-92. The Second Circuit also held that
§ 1113 applied in the sale context, confirming the viability of the sale device as a
reorganization method. Id. at 91.
88 See In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 149 B.R. 334, 338-39 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in
part and aff'd in part,981 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Maxwell Newspapers, 981 F.2d at
89. See also Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 110 S.Ct. 2126, 2133
(1990) (maintaining that "[o]ur cases express a deep reluctance to interpret a statu-

1534

SETON HALL LI W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1516

remains elusive notwithstanding these three decisions. This Article suggests that the separate good cause requirement is inconsistent with the policy of fostering reorganizations and that
§ 1113 should be amended to eliminate this element.
Second, the result of the Second Circuit's condition that the
Debtor hold open its last offer is that the debtor's ability to impose new terms after a collective bargaining agreement has been
rejected is limited to the final proposal made to the union, even if
that proposal is made after the § 1113 hearing (or even the initial
decision). 89 This rule creates a disincentive for the union to
reach consensual agreements with a debtor. There will now be a
great risk that the union will attempt to manipulate the negotiation process to induce the debtor to make increasingly favorable
proposals, and then litigate over the final proposal. At that stage,
the union cannot lose: the union will either be able to defeat the
debtor's rejection motion if it can convince the bankruptcy court
that the debtor has failed to comply fully with § 1113; or, the
union will be governed by the debtor's final proposal, plus it will
have the benefit of a claim for damages arising from rejection of
the collective bargaining agreement.90 Requiring the Debtor to
tory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment") (citation omitted).
89 In theory the union could turn down the debtor's final proposal after rejection is approved, but there would be no rational reason for doing so. If the union
did reject the final proposal, it is unclear whether under the Second Circuit's decision the debtor would be at liberty to unilaterally implement any changes to the
terms and conditions of employment of its union employees.
90 Prior to the enactment of § 1113, courts had either held or assumed that a
union was entitled to rejection damages when a collective bargaining agreement
was rejected pursuant to § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. See NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 530-31 (1984) (assuming that rejection of collective bargaining agreement would give rise to rejection claims governed by 11 U.S.C.
§§ 365(g)(1) and 502(g)); U.S. Truck Co. v. Teamsters Nat'l Freight Indust. Negotiating Comm. (In re U.S. Truck), 89 B.R. 618, 623-24 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (same).
Following the enactment of § 1113, most courts have likewise assumed that rejection damages remain available. See, e.g., Carey Transp., 816 F.2d at 93 (observing
that in determining whether equities favor rejection, bankruptcy court should consider, inter alia, "the possibility and likely effect of any employee claims for breach
of contract if rejection is approved"); In re Garofalo's Finer Foods, Inc., 117 B.R.
363, 371 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1990) (same); In re Salt Creek Freightways, 47 B.R. 835,
841 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985) (noting that damages resulting from rejection of a collective bargaining agreement will have to be estimated pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 502(c)). The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, however,
recently held that a union is not entitled to damages arising from interim changes
to a collective bargaining agreement pursuant to § 1.113(e) or from rejection pursuant to §§ 113(b) and (c). In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 147 B.R. 720, 732, 734
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992). The bankruptcy court reasoned that the congressional
enactment of § 1113 expressly removed collective bargaining agreements from
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keep the last offer open is inimical to the goal of obtaining consensual modifications of collective bargaining agreements and
should be eliminated.
A.

The Elusive Good Cause Element under Section 11 13(c)(2)

Section 1113 does not define good cause, nor does it provide any textual support for giving any particular meaning to this
language.
1. The Legislative History
The legislative history sheds no light on the meaning of
good cause under § 1113(c) (2). The Bildisco decision provoked
wildly disparate reactions from members of Congress;9 1 indeed,
Congress was unable to agree upon a conference report for
§ 1113.92 The legislative history thus "consists of little more
than self-serving statements by opposing partisans ' 93 and as such
'
"is singularly unhelpful." 94
This is particularly true with respect
to § 111 3's good cause requirement. For example, Senator
Thurmond commented:
The requirement that the union refusal to accept the proposal
be "without good cause" is obviously not intended to import
traditional labor law concepts into a bankruptcy forum or turn
the bankruptcy courts into a version of the National Labor Relations Board. Again, the intent is for these provisions to be
interpreted in a workable manner.95
Simply stating that good cause is not a labor law concept 96 and that
§ 365 analysis. Id. at 730. Accordingly, neither § 3 6 5 (g) nor § 502(g), which govern rejection claims under § 365, is applicable. Id. While resolution of the issues
raised by Blue Diamond Coal is beyond the scope of this Article, the unavailability of
rejection damages would not change the authors' analysis.
91 Compare 130 CONG. REC. 20,081 (1984) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) ("I believe that the Bildisco decision was correctly decided and did not require legislative
action by Congress") with 130 CONG. REC. 6200 (1984) (statement of Rep. Rodino)
(offering proposed legislation requiring application of stricter standard adopted in
Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 and 1073 (1975)).
92 Charnov, supra note 13, at 954.
93 In re Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc., 899 F.2d 887, 890 (10th Cir. 1990).
94 Gibson, supra note 13, at 340. See also Judith D. Nichols, Note, Reection of
Collective BargainingAgreements by Chapter 11 Debtors: The Necessity Requirement Under
Section 1113, 21 GA. L. REV. 967, 1005 (1987) (suggesting that the wide range of
comments by individual members of Congress regarding § 1113 demonstrated the
lack of consensus on the subject and the difficulties of assessing congressional intent) (footnote omitted).
95 130 CONG. REC. 20,081-82 (1984).
96 See West, supra note 13, at 47 (suggesting that labor law precedent does not
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it is "to be interpreted in a workable manner" (as presumably all
statutes are to be interpreted) adds little to one's understanding of
this provision. Senator Hatch's statement that "the union can only
reject such a good faith offer for cause good enough to justify the
risk of the business' collapse," 9 7 without suggesting what this might
be, is also unhelpful. 9 8 Finally, Senator Packwood suggested that
the good cause requirement adds nothing to the statute:
The "without good cause" language provides an incentive of
pressure on the debtor to negotiate in good faith. In practical
terms, this language imposes no barrierto rejection ifthe debtor'sproposal has contained only the specified "necessary" modifications. Thus,
the language serves to prohibit any bad faith conduct by an
employer, while at the same time protecting the employer
from a Union's rejection of the proposal without good
cause.

2.
a.

99

The Emerging Case Law
The Cases that Ignore the Good Cause Element

The case law construing the good cause requirement is no
more helpful than the legislative history. For example, some
courts have simply held that a union lacks good cause when the
debtor has otherwise complied with §§ 1113(c)(1) and (3) by
making a proposal that contains only necessary modifications and
establishing that the balance of equities clearly favor rejection.'
provide assistance in interpreting § 1113(c) because labor law has no counterpart
to § 1113(c)'s requirement that, absent good cause to refuse, a union must accept
proposed modifications). West noted that the term good cause "cannot import labor law concepts into the bankruptcy courts, at least not NLRA concepts, because
this language is foreign to the NLRA." Id.
97 130 CONG. REC. 20,085 (1984).
98 Indeed, because all of the debtor's employees will inevitably lose their jobs if
the business collapses and creditors will likely recover only a fraction of their
claims, if anything, it is difficult to imagine what would constitute cause good
enough to warrant such a drastic result.
99 130 CONG. REC. 20,092 (1984) (emphasis added). See also Gibson, supra note
13, at 341 (noting the unlikelihood that a bankruptcy court would find a good cause
rejection of a proposal when the proposal requires shared sacrifice among the parties, satisfies § 1113(b)(1) requirements and only seeks modifications necessary for
the continued existence of the firm).
1oo In re Valley Steel Prods. Co., 142 B.R. 337, 342 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992) (concluding that union lacked good cause where, absent changes, liquidation was likely
and "[t]he proposed modifications treat the creditors, the debtors, the Teamsters
and other affected parties fairly and equitably"); In re Walway Co., 69 B.R. 967, 975
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) (finding that "[blecause the proposal was necessary and
equitable pursuant to § 1113, the Union's rejection of the modification was without
good cause"); In re Carey Transp., 50 B.R. 203, 211-12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd sub nom., Truck Drivers Local 807, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Carey
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These cases do not even attempt to examine responsive offers
made by the union, and as all three courts correctly concluded in
the MNI case, when the union has participated in the negotiating
process, this approach effectively renders § 1113(c)(2) superfluous, as suggested by Senator Packwood.' 0
b.

The Focus on the BargainingProcess

Other courts have held that a union lacks good cause when it
has failed to participate meaningfully in negotiations with the
debtor regarding the proposed modifications to the collective
bargaining agreement. 0 2 These cases suggest that good cause
-

at least under some circumstances

-

is somehow linked to the

negotiating process and agree that it somehow differs from labor
law concepts. 0 3 The cases, however, fail to offer any guidance in
Transp., 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that because debtor's "proposal contained necessary modifications and was fair and equitable... it must be found that
the Union's refusal to accept [the] proposal was without good cause within the
meaning of the statute"); In re Allied Delivery Sys. Co., 49 B.R. 700, 704 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1985) (maintaining that "[i]f the proposal is necessary and is fair and
equitable .... then the union's refusal to accept it on the basis that the proposal is
unjust ... is not for good cause").
101 In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 146 B.R. 920, 932 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in
part and aff'd in part, 149 B.R. 334, 339 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 981
F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1992). Other cases construing § 1113 are also consistent with
the MNI decisions. See, e.g., Carey Tramp., 816 F.2d at 91-92; In re Texas Sheet
Metals, Inc., 90 B.R. 260, 271 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988) (citations omitted). This
Article, however, suggests that Senator Packwood was ultimately correct: much
confusion and costly litigation and gamesmanship will be eliminated if the good
cause requirement were deleted from § 1113 by legislative enactment.
102 See, e.g., Carey Transp., 816 F.2d at 92 (union stonewalled during negotiations);
In re Alabama Symphony Assoc., 155 B.R. 556, 577 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993) (union
lacked good cause when it refused to negotiate meaningfully). In re GCI, Inc., 131
B.R. 685, 695 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991) (union refused to negotiate regarding seniority issues); In re Texas Sheet Metals, 90 B.R. at 271 (unions failed to offer counterproposal); In re Sol-Sieff Produce Co., 82 B.R. 787, 795 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988)
(union refused to negotiate at all); In re Amherst Sparkle Mkt., Inc., 75 B.R. 847,
853 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (unreasonable delay in responding to debtor's proposal); In re Kentucky Truck Sales, Inc., 52 B.R. 797, 805 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985)
(refusal to negotiate regarding medical benefits).
103 For example, the Second Circuit has stated that "bargaining in good faith is
not intended to import labor law into the bankruptcy forum. Rather, the intent is
for these provisions to be interpreted in a 'workable manner.' " Century Brass
Prods., Inc. v. Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers
(In re Century Brass Prods., Inc.), 795 F.2d 265, 273 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
949 (1986) (citing 130 CONG. REC. S8888, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583). Another court has stated that' "bankruptcy courts are not meant to follow labor law
decisions in determining what constitutes good cause." In re K & B Mounting, Inc.,
50 B.R. 460, 465 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985). While labor law principles are clearly
not controlling, however, they can perhaps shed some light on what should be considered good faith bargaining in the context of § 1113. The basic labor law princi-
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the more difficult case where the union participated in the negotiating process but ultimately failed to accept the debtor's final
proposal for a clearly articulated reason.
The district court's decision in the MNI is perhaps an extreme example of the examination of the negotiating process.
The district court focused exclusively on whether the Debtor and
Zuckerman had somehow violated the district court's concept of
appropriate bargaining. The district court concluded, as a factual matter, that the shift in proposals to Local 6 violated this
normative concept and determined that this violation gave Local
6 good cause to reject the final proposal made to it, notwithstanding the potentially devastating impact on the Debtor's reorganization and the jobs of its almost 2000 employees. 0 4
The district court also concluded that it was too late to make
an offer changing the nature of the proposals on the eve of the
hearing on the rejection motion. Not only was this conclusion
wrong as a factual matter, 0 5 but even if it were true, denying
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement under such circumstances is massive overkill. The more rational solution is to
adjourn briefly the § 1113 hearing if the union asserts that it
needs additional time to consider the final proposal and respond
with a proposal of its own.' 6 Indeed, § 1113(d)(1) expressly
contemplates that the time for commencing the § 1113 hearing
may be extended for up to seven days, and longer if the debtor
and the union mutually agree to do so. 107
pies are as follows: The duty to bargain in good faith is a statutory requirement
found in § 8(d) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). That requirement imposes on
the parties an "obligation . . . to participate actively in the deliberations so as to
indicate a present intention to find a basis for agreement ......
THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAw 608 (3d ed. 1992) (quotation omitted). Such obligation implies both
"an open mind and a sincere desire to reach an agreement," as well as "a sincere
effort.., to reach a common ground." In assessing a party's good faith, the "totality of the conduct" is considered. Id. at 608-15. While easy to state, a leading labor
law treatise concludes that these principles have been difficult and controversial to
apply. Id. at 610.
104 In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 149 B.R. 334, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd in
part and aff'd in part, 981 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992) (asserting that "even the threat of
closing the Daily News does not justify abandonment of the [clongressional
design").
105 See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
106 Significantly, Local 6 made no such request to the bankruptcy court.
107 Section 11 13(d)(l) provides in pertinent part:
Upon the filing of an application for rejection the court shall
schedule a hearing to be held not later than fourteen days after the
date of the filing of such application ....
The court may extend the
time for the commencement of such hearing for a period not exceed-
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The district court's construction of good cause suffers from
both practical and analytic defects. Practically, it will inevitably
preclude rejection in many situations where the debtor's dire
economic straits mandate it, simply because the union negotiated
in good faith or because of defective bargaining by the debtor.
An approach this divorced from the reorganization process will
doom the reorganization efforts of many companies that have excessive labor costs. The approach is also contrary to the policy
underlying chapter 11 of fostering reorganization as the best
method of saving jobs and maximizing the returns of creditors.
Moreover, even assuming that the debtor has not bargained completely in good faith, it is not clear why less than perfect negotiations should have the effect of forcing the debtor into liquidation
and causing the debtor's employees - both union and nonunion
to lose their jobs.
Analytically, the district court's approach - equating good
cause to the debtor's failure to comply with § 1113(b)(2) - renders § 1113(c)(2) mere surplusage: good cause would be irrelevant in this circumstance, because the debtor has simply failed to
establish another element of its prima facie case.
c.

The Focus on the Debtor's Needs

A number of other courts and commentators have suggested

that good cause is, instead, properly viewed as a function of
whether the union, in responding to the debtor's proposal to
modify the collective bargaining agreement, has addressed the
debtor's economic needs in reorganizing. The bankruptcy court
in In re Salt Creek Freightways108 was an early proponent of this
view.'0 9 The bankruptcy court there stated:
[I]t is not necessary to find that a Union has rejected the
debtor's proposal in 'bad faith' or for some contrary motive.
In fact, the Union may often have a principled reason for deciding to reject the debtor's proposal and which may, when
viewed subjectively and from the standpoint of self-interest, be
a perfectly good reason. However, the court must review the
Union's rejection utilizing an objective standard which narrowly construes the phrase 'without good cause' in light of the
ing seven days where the circumstances of the case, and the interests
of justice require such extension, or for additional periods of time to
which the trustee and representative agree.

11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(1).
108 47 B.R. 835 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
109 See id. at 840-41.
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main purpose of Chapter 11, namely reorganization of financially distressed businesses." 0
More recently, in In re Royal Composing Room, Inc.," 1 the Second
Circuit stated that "[i]f the union seeks to negotiate compromises
that meet its needs while preserving the debtor's required savings, it
would be unlikely that its rejection of the proposal could be found
to lack good cause.""' 2 Similarly, Richard H. Gibson, in an early
and influential article interpreting § 1113, suggested that a union
will have good cause to reject the debtor's proposal when the union
itself makes a counterproposal that complies with § 1113(b)(2),
even if such proposal is "offensive to management and favorable to
the union."" ' 3 Gibson reasoned:
[O]ne of the primary purposes of all of the provisions of section 1113 is to place "the primary focus on the private collective-bargaining process and not in the courts." If the court
has before it two proposals, either one of which is satisfactory
from the perspective of section 1113 and of bankruptcy law
generally, it would seem that a bankruptcy court would have
neither the need nor the expertise to select between them. In
such a case, as the union has demonstrated a willingness to
agree to proper modifications of the agreement, it would be
hard to justify court intervention in favor of the debtor."14
The problem with this standard is that the precise economic impact of many proposals will be difficult if not impossible to quantify.
The standard puts the bankruptcy court in the position of attempting to evaluate competing proposals that are not readily comparable
to determine whether the union's proposals also will permit the
debtor to reorganize. Thus, while quantifying the effect of a wage
or benefit reduction is a relatively simple matter, other modifications - which may be just as critical to the long term health and
successful reorganization of the enterprise - may not be susceptible to being reduced to an immediate dollar amount. For example,
I O Id. See also In re Valley Steel Prods. Co., 142 B.R. 337, 341-42 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1992) (declaring that the union failed to substantiate its claims that it negotiated in good faith when it agreed to substantial cost cuts); In re Indiana Grocery
Co., 138 B.R. 40, 49-50 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990) (finding the union's failure to negotiate wage adjustments, which was based on its belief that the debtor's business
was doomed, lacked good cause).
111 848 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989).
112
113
114

Id. at 349.

Gibson, supra note 13, at 341.
Id. at 342 (quoting 130 CONG. REC. 20,092 (1984) (statement of Sen.
Packwood)). Gibson buttresses his conclusion with the labor law principal that "it
is improper for a court to compel one or the other of the parties to accept particular
terms of a contract." Id.
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how is a bankruptcy court to compare the debtor's proposal to eliminate seniority rules and the union's counterproposal to lift certain
work rules?
There is a more fundamental flaw with this notion - it is totally

at odds with the policy of fostering the debtor's reorganization. If,
in fact, the union proposes modifications to the collective bargaining agreement that equally meet the needs of the reorganization, it
makes no sense to conclude that the appropriate result is to maintain the status quo and thereby ensure the debtor's ultimate
demise."15
d.

The Second Circuit's Dual Concerns

The Second Circuit's articulation of good cause in the MNI
decision is an uneasy and unfinished amalgam of the "bargaining
process" concept of good cause (as articulated by the district
court) and the "needs of the reorganization" concept of good
cause (as articulated by Royal Composing). On the one hand, the
Second Circuit's statement that "the entire thrust of § 1113 is to
ensure that well-informed and good faith negotiations occur in
the market place,"" 6 and its suggestion that this process protects
a union from "an employer whose proposals may be offered in
bad faith,""' 7 evokes the notion that good cause is related to, if
not synonymous with, good faith bargaining and that good cause
may be based upon a defect in the bargaining process alone. On
the other hand, the Second Circuit's suggestion that "where the
union makes compromise proposals during the negotiating process that meet its needs while preserving the debtor's savings, its
rejection of the debtor's proposal would be with good cause""'
suggests that a union will not have good cause unless it substantively meets the debtor's proposal by formulating a counterproposal that is equally geared to the needs of the reorganization.
The Second Circuit's opinion is best read as imposing both a
procedural and substantive requirement on the union. For a
115 After the denial of the debtor's motion to reject, the debtor in theory could
simply adopt the union's proposal as its own and commence a new § 1113 negotiation if the union was unwilling to immediately agree to such proposal. This step,
however, would inevitably result in the needless expenditure of the resources of the
parties and the bankruptcy court. Section 1113 is silent as to whether the debtor
may make more than one motion to reject a particular collective bargaining agreement. One bankruptcy court has indicated that such successive motions are permitted. See In re GCI, Inc., 131 B.R. 685, 697 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991).
116 In re Maxwell Newspaper, Inc., 981 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 1992).
117 Id.
118 Id. (citations omitted).
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union to have good cause, (1) it must bargain in good faith with
the debtor by making a proposal that (2) also meets the needs of
the reorganization process. Either requirement, standing alone,
will be insufficient. Thus, good faith bargaining that does not
address the needs of the reorganization will not constitute good
cause. Similarly, a proposal designed to deal with the needs of
the reorganization that is framed in a manner that will be unacceptable to the debtor will also not constitute good cause. For
example, a union counterproposal that results in economic savings comparable to the debtor's proposal, but that imposes restrictions on management's prerogatives in a previously
unrestricted area as a quid pro quo for agreeing to this change,
will not be deemed good cause under this construction of
§ 11 13(c)(2). Likewise, as was the case with the Debtor's negotiations with Local 6, a union will not have rejected the debtor's
proposal with good cause when the union's counterproposal insists that the union be given certain "sweeteners" as the price of
the union's consent to the excision of the burdensome provision
from the collective bargaining agreement.
This construction of good cause removes some, but by no
means all, of the problems associated with the other interpretations of the provision. By focusing on the union's negotiations
with the debtor, the problem of a redundant interpretation of the
statute is eliminated. Similarly, the good faith requirement will
eliminate certain union proposals as constituting good cause because of the presence of demands for "sweeteners" and other
unacceptable provisions, thus eliminating the need for the bankruptcy court to weigh the relative economic merits of competing
proposals in such instances. The latter problem will still remain,
however, in those cases in which the union's counterproposal
does not suffer from this defect.
3.

Future Solutions to the Good Cause Problem

One possible partial solution to the good cause problem
would be to shift the burden of proof to the union to show that it
had good cause to reject the debtor's final proposal."t 9 This
119 Section 1113(c) does not on its face impose the burden of proof on the
debtor. Courts have uniformly held, however, that the debtor bears the ultimate
burden of persuasion with respect to each of § 1113(c)'s substantive requirements.
See, e.g., Truck Drivers Local 807, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Carey Transp.,
816 F.2d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 1987); Century Brass Prods., Inc. v. Int'l Union, United
Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers (In re Century Brass Prods., Inc.),
795 F.2d 265, 266 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986); In re Maxwell Newspa-
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would require the union to articulate and prove not only the elements of its counterproposal, but also how those elements would
mesh with the debtor's reorganization needs. By imposing this
burden on the union, the bankruptcy court's task of evaluating
competing proposals would at least be substantially, if not
wholly, alleviated. In many instances the union would not be
able to meet this burden. In those instances where it does, the
debtor would likely face significant pressure to withdraw its application to reject the collective bargaining agreement and to accept the union's counterproposal.
This suggestion is, however, a stopgap measure at best. The
preferable alternative would be to eliminate the good cause concept from § 1113 entirely. The true problem is that Congress
had no clear reason to include the good cause requirement in
§ 1113 in the first instance, and courts and commentators alike
have constantly struggled to give meaning to this legislative
afterthought.
This radical legislative change is necessary to reconcile
§ 1113 with the reorganization policy of chapter 11. If, in fact, a
debtor proposes modifications to a collective bargaining agreement, which are necessary to the reorganization process, such
policy - as well as fairness to all of the parties, including the
debtor's union and nonunion employees - compels the conclusion that there can be no cause good enough to tilt the scales in
favor of liquidation. 20 Denying rejection under such circumstances elevates form over substance, giving the union a hollow
victory. It simply makes no sense to hold that the effect of the
union having submitted a proposal that meets the needs of the
2
reorganization is that those needs should therefore go unmet.' '

pers, Inc., 149 B.R. 334, 337 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 981 F.2d 85
(2d Cir. 1992). The union has the duty of production on certain issues, including
whether it had good cause to reject the final proposal. See, e.g., In re Mile Hi Metal
Sys., Inc., 899 F.2d 887, 892 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907,
909-10 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
120 Cf. In re Mile Hi Metal Sys., 899 F.2d at 891 (positing that "[a] proposal containing modifications which, if implemented, would violate labor law, does not per
se fail to satisfy subpart (b)(l)(A), and does not relieve the union of its duty to
confer in good faith").
121 As one bankruptcy court remarked in granting the debtor's motion to reject
its collective bargaining agreement:
It is clear that § 1113 was intended to benefit the Union as well as the
Debtor. It is based upon the simple but logical notion that in light of
a failing business, employment that yields lesser benefits is preferable
to no employment at all. If a company is saved by § 1113, then everyone is benefitted.
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Merely eliminating the good cause requirement will not,
however, fully correct § 1113's deficiencies. Even if the bankruptcy court approves rejection, undesirable consequences can
result. If the union has significant bargaining strength, the
debtor may find that rejection of the collective bargaining agreement leads to a strike by the employees represented by the
union, with the potential for economic decimation of the debtor's
business.1 22 If the strong union does not strike, at the very least
it may force the debtor into a bargain that is less desirable than
what the court determined was necessary to reorganization, or
that contains adverse long-term trade-offs for any economic relief the union reluctantly has conceded. Conversely, if the union
has little or no bargaining strength, as was the case with Local 6
in the MNI case, the union faces the possibility that rejection of
its contract may lead to a substantial diminution of the wages,
benefits and working conditions attained through years of negotiation prior to the bankruptcy.
Therefore, we suggest that the chapter 11 situation is an appropriate one for use of a form of "final offer" arbitration as the
procedural vehicle for restructuring a collective bargaining
agreement that is an obstacle to a company's reorganizing. This
approach might work as follows:
The debtor would make a written proposal to the union of
the type required by § 1113(b) (1) (A) (one necessary to permit
reorganization, treating all parties fairly and equitably) and provide relevant information. The parties would be required to bargain for a designated period, e.g., fourteen days. If no agreement
is reached, at the end of this bargaining period the parties would
be required to exchange detailed written proposals for changes
in the collective bargaining agreement, drafted in the form of explicit contract language changes desired by the party, leaving
nothing further to negotiate if a proposal is accepted.
Simultaneously, the parties would submit their alternate proposals to the bankruptcy court with supporting papers, and a
hearing would be set no later than an additional fourteen days
after submission to the bankruptcy court. During the period of
time between submission and the court hearing, the parties could
bargain further if they desired. If no agreement is reached, at the
In re Walway Co., 69 B.R. 967, 975 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987).
122 Upon rejection the union is free to exercise its right to strike. See, e.g., Carey
Transp., 816 F.2d at 93; In re Kentucky Truck Sales, Inc., 52 B.R. 797, 806 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1985).
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hearing both parties would present evidence as to their respective proposals and why their proposal better serves the requirements of § 1113(b)(1)(A).
After the hearing, the bankruptcy court would select one
proposal or the other; the court could not pick and choose parts
of each proposal. The court's order would provide that the existing contract would be modified in accord with the proposal selected and both parties would be required to comply with the
contract as revised.
This approach encourages a bargained solution. Neither
side can overreach without risking taking its position "out of the
picture." If both sides present responsible proposals, there is a
substantial chance the parties will bridge any gap to save litigation costs. There is no risk of a status quo standoff as at present,
because the proposal that better carries out the purposes of
§ 1113(b)(1)(A) will be adopted. There should be a reduction in
appeals from the bankruptcy court because there will be fewer
potential statutory interpretation issues, and the bankruptcy
judge's opinion will only be subject to reversal on a clearly erroneous basis. If both proposals equally advance the purposes of
§ 11 13(b)(l)(A), the business judgment rule could be used to
support selection of the debtor's proposal.
The economic results of this final offer arbitration will depend less on bargaining power and more on the needs of the
reorganization and fairness to all parties. Although this approach is a departure from the historical antipathy of employers
and unions to arbitrating the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement, it is a small price to pay to foster the goals of reorganization. In any event, the changes made in the collective bargaining agreement would apply only until the contract expired, at
which point the parties could exercise their economic power to
23
the extent desired.1

123 The concept of "final offer" arbitration that we propose for § 1113 is akin to
final offer salary arbitration in major league baseball. While baseball owners often
bemoan the system because of an inability to control the skyrocketing baseball salaries, see, e.g., Chass, Thud! Economic Report Lands on Baseball's Desk, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
7, 1992, at C2, similar "skyrocketing" proposals should not occur in the § 1113
process because the benchmark for evaluation is the reorganization of the debtor.
The theory that final offer arbitration greatly encourages negotiated resolutions has
been borne out in the baseball field. For example, a study in 1986 noted that for
most parties, the threat of final offer arbitration in baseball creates strong incentives for both good faith bargaining between the parties and the use of self-help in
settling any differences that may exist. James B. Dworkin, Salary Arbitration in Baseball: An ImpartialAssessment After Ten Years, ARB.J. 63, 69 (1986). Indeed, the threat
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What Does Rejection of a Collective BargainingAgreement Mean?

Section 1113 is silent as to what happens after a collective
bargaining agreement is rejected. May the debtor unilaterally
change any or all terms and conditions of employment contained
in the now rejected collective bargaining agreement? May the
debtor terminate any or all of the employees represented by the
union? Or is the debtor required to maintain all the terms and
conditions of employment and continue good faith bargaining
until an impasse is reached?' 2 4 Is the debtor permitted to make
certain changes without further bargaining, but not others?
Most bankruptcy practitioners, familiar with the impact of rejection on other executory contracts and unexpired leases pursuant to § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, would probably assume
that the debtor is free to impose any terms on the union that the
relative economic bargaining power of the parties will permit after rejection. Under § 365(g)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, rejection of an executory contract that has not been previously
assumed creates a breach of contract which is deemed to have
arisen immediately prepetition.12 5 Any claims against the debtor
arising from such breach are treated as prepetition claims and
allowed or disallowed like any other prepetition claim.' 26 The
debtor is free to deal with the nondebtor party as it chooses. It
may propose any new terms to govern the parties' relationship
going forward, or determine to sever its relationship.
of final offer arbitration is apparently so great in baseball that, even after a player
files for arbitration, the parties almost always reach agreement before the arbitration hearing. See, e.g., Chass, The Wheel of Fortune: 149 Seek Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 1992, at B12 (noting that, in 1991, 153 players filed for arbitration but only
16 finally went to arbitration); Chass, 3 PirateStars Top List of 159 in Arbitration, N.Y.
TiMES, Jan. 16, 1991, at D22 (noting that, in 1990, 164 players filed for arbitration
but only 24 finally went to arbitration).
124 Section 1113 does not impose a requirement that the parties bargain to impasse. See, e.g., Century Brass Prods., Inc. v. Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace
and Agric. Implement Workers (In re Century Brass Prods., Inc.), 795 F.2d 265, 272
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986). Thus it is entirely possible for the § 1113
bargaining process to be completed without an actual impasse having been
reached.
36
125 Section
5(g)(1) provides in pertinent part:
[T]he rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor constitutes a breach of such contract or lease (1) if such contract or lease has not been assumed under this
section or under a plan confirmed under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of
this title, immediately before the date of the filing of the petition ....
11 U.S.C. § 3 6 5(g)(1).
126 Id. § 502(g).
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NLRA Principles

Unlike the situation posed by rejection of a non-labor executory contract, however, the relationship between the debtor and a
union representing the debtor's employees is governed not only
by a collective bargaining agreement, but by the statutory framework of the NLRA. Briefly, the NLRA mandates that an employer and the union engage in good faith bargaining upon

expiration of a collective bargaining agreement.' 2 7 One corollary
to this duty to bargain is that an expired collective bargaining
agreement precludes an employer from disrupting the status quo
until a new agreement is reached or the parties bargain to impasse. 12 Only once an impasse has been reached may an employer unilaterally implement new terms and conditions of
employment: these new terms are limited to terms that were reasonably contemplated by its bargaining proposals 2 9 or substan127 See NLRA §§ 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3) and 8(d), codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5),
158(b)(3) and 158(d). See also NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43 (1962); Inland
Tugs v. NLRB, 918 F.2d 1299, 1307 (7th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied en banc, 1991 U.S.
App. LEXIS 131 (7th Cir. 1991).
128 Teamsters Local Union No. 175 v. NLRB, 788 F.2d 27, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
The NLRB has not developed a single definition of when impasse occurs. See
NLRB v. H&H Pretzel Co., 831 F.2d 650, 656 (6th Cir. 1987) (noting that there is
no statutory definition of impasse); Blue Grass Provision Co. v. NLRB, 636 F.2d
1127, 1130 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 915 (1981) (pointing out that "impasse" can not be defined precisely). An impasse will be found when "good-faith
negotiations have exhausted the prospects of concluding an agreement." Taft
Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475,478 (1967), enf'd sub nom. Am. Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Accord Teamsters
Local Union No. 175, 788 F.2d at 30; NLRB v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 964 F.2d
1153, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1992); River City Mechanical, 289 N.L.R.B. 1503, 1505
(1988). The absence of agreement on a tentative contract obviously is a key factor
in finding impasse, because an impasse cannot arise simultaneously with a tentative
agreement on a contract. LaPorte Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 888 F.2d 1182, 1187 n.2
(7th Cir. 1989). See also Teamster Local Union No. 175, 788 F.2d at 30-31 (adopting
definition of impasse "as the deadlock reached by bargaining parties 'after good
faith negotiations have exhausted the prospects of concluding an agreement' ")
(footnote omitted); FrancisJ. Fischer, Inc., 289 N.L.R.B. 815, 820-21 (1988) (stating that "the number and extent of bargaining sessions," although not dispositive,
should be considered in determining whether an impasses has been reached, as
well as the magnitude of concessions sought). The parties can only negotiate to
impasse over mandatory subjects of bargaining. See, e.g., Louisiana Dock Co. v.
NLRB, 909 F.2d 281, 288 (7th Cir. 1990).
In analyzing whether an impasse in bargaining exists, the NLRB will consider:
"The bargaining history, the good faith of the parties in negotiations, the length of
the negotiations, the importance of the issue or issues as to which there is disagreement, [and] the contemporaneous understanding of the parties .... " Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. at 478. The party asserting that an impasse has occurred
bears the burden of persuasion. Baytown Sun, 255 N.L.R.B. 154, 157 (1981).
129 See, e.g., Katz, 396 U.S. at 743, n.l 1 (citation omitted); Huck Mfg. Co. v.
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tially similar to such proposals.13 0

2.

Bildisco's Resolution

Neither § 1113 nor the NLRA, however, addresses the issue
of how the two statutory paradigms of the Bankruptcy Code and
the NLRA are to be reconciled, if at all, post-rejection. Before
the adoption of § 1113, the Supreme Court in Bildisco stated that
the NLRA is applicable post-rejection, noting that after rejection
"a debtor-in-possession is an 'employer' within the terms of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(1) and (2) and is obligated to bargain
collectively with the employees' certified representative over the
terms of a new contract ...

following formal approval of rejec-

tion by the bankruptcy court." ' 3 ' Consistent with Bildisco, several
cases decided after the enactment of § 1113 have concluded that
following rejection, the employer must continue to bargain with
3 2

1
the union.

3.

Section 1113 Confusion

It is not at all clear, however, what this duty to bargain
means in the § 1113 context. Is the debtor's duty to bargain satisfied by the pre-rejection bargaining mandated by § 1113, even
though the parties may not have actually reached an impasse? If
continued bargaining is required, then must the debtor use its
last proposal as the starting point, or may the debtor suggest additional or deeper changes to the collective bargaining agreement than were raised during the previous bargaining?
Prior to the Second Circuit's decision in the MNI case, the
few courts that had considered the issue in the context of a rejection under § 1113 had reached a variety of conclusions. For example, the bankruptcy court in In re Mile Hi Metal Systems, Inc. 133
stated that the debtor is limited to implementing its final propoNLRB, 693 F.2d 1176, 1186 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that after negotiating to impasse, employer may unilaterally implement terms previously offered to union);
Taft Broadcasting, 163 N.L.R.B. at 478. But see River City Mechanical, 289 N.L.R.B.
1503, 1503 (1988) (concluding that although employer bargained in good faith to
impasse, it nonetheless committed an unfair labor practice when it subsequently
unilaterally implemented terms not encompassed by its proposals).
130 Atlas Tack Corp., 226 N.L.R.B. 222 (1976), enf'd, 559 F.2d 1201 (1st Cir.
1976).
131 Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 534.
132 See, e.g., In re Kentucky Truck Sales, Inc., 52 B.R. 797, 806 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1985); In re Salt Creek Freightways, 47 B.R. 835, 842 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
133 51 B.R. 509 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 67 B.R. 114 (D.
Colo. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 899 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1990).
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In that case, the bankruptcy court stated

that the debtor's proposal "defines the parameters of any relief
the court may subsequently grant the debtor."'' 5 The bankruptcy court based this conclusion solely' 3 6 upon a joint statement made by Representatives Hughes and Morrison that "the
court in framing such relief may not go beyond the ' proposal
3 7
made by the trustee pursuant to subsection (b)(1)(A)."'

Leaving aside the wisdom of basing a decision upon isolated
statements made by members of Congress, 3 " this remark is in

any event inconsistent with the negotiating framework created by
§ 1113. Although § 1113(b)(1)(A) requires that the debtor make

an initial proposal before seeking rejection, the court considers
39
the final proposal in ruling on the debtor's rejection motion.1

Moreover, the relief that a motion to reject requests from the
court is rejection of the entire
contract, not modification in ac140
cordance with a proposal.
In In re Allied Delivery System Co., 14 ' the bankruptcy court allowed rejection even though the collective bargaining agreement
was due to expire shortly, apparently in the belief that rejection,
as opposed to expiration, would permit the debtor to implement
immediately changes in the terms and conditions of employment. 14 2 It is unclear from the bankruptcy court's decision, however, whether such changes were limited by the debtor's prerejection proposals. The bankruptcy court in In re Salt Creek
134 By contrast, the Second Circuit in MNI conditioned relief on the debtor holding open its final offer. In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 981 F.2d 85, 91-92 (2d Cir.
1992).
135 In re Mile Hi Metal Sys., 51 B.R. at 510.
136 The bankruptcy court did not consider whether such a result was mandated
by the NLRA.
137 In re Mile Hi Metal Sys., 51 B.R. at 510 (quoting 130 CONG. REC. 20,093
(1984)).
138 See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
139 See supra note 68.
140 Section 1113 does not authorize the court to impose on the parties a modified
collective bargaining agreement to which they do not agree. In re Alabama Symphony Assoc., 1993 WL 217372, **13-14 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. May 17, 1993)
(§ 1113(c) permits only rejection, not modification, of the collective bargaining
agreement). In re Carey Transp., 50 B.R. 203, 210 n.4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd
sub nom. Truck Drivers Local 807, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Carey Transp.,
816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Russell Transfer, Inc., 48 B.R. 241, 243-44 (Bankr.
W.D. Va. 1985). Cf In re Garofalo's Finer Foods, Inc., 117 B.R. 363 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1990) (noting that § 11 13(b)(1)(A) expressly refers to "rejection," but that it is
unclear whether other forms of relief are permitted or denied).
141 49 B.R. 700 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
142 Id. at 704.
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Freightways143 reached the same result as Allied Delivery with essen14 4
tially the same reasoning.
Reaching a somewhat middle ground, the bankruptcy court
in In re Kentucky Truck Sales 4 5 also stated, without citing any authority, that rejection "does not mark an end but rather a new
phase in the negotiations between the parties. ' ' t 4 6 The bankruptcy court further noted that it retained "jurisdiction over future proceedings in this case" 14 7 and that "[t]he debtor has a
continuing duty to operate its business in a fair and commercially
reasonable manner."'14 8 This language suggests that the debtor
has some latitude in setting new terms - that the debtor is not
limited to its final proposal - but a duty of "fairness and reasonableness" of unstated origin, which is ultimately subject to bankruptcy court review, limits that latitude. Similarly, the
bankruptcy court in In re Alabama Symphony Association' 49 suggested that any decision to reject would be "subject to further
out-of-court negotiations" between the debtor and the union. 5 °
A number of commentators have concluded that, following
rejection, the debtor must maintain the status quo and continue
to bargain with the union until an impasse is reached, at which
point the debtor may implement its final proposal.'"' This conclusion is perhaps the logical result of Bildisco's assumption that a
debtor still has a duty to bargain under the NLRA about the
terms and conditions of employment post-rejection, but it is impossible to reconcile with the chapter 11 reorganization process.
In effect, this assumption would impose on the debtor - by definition already in a financially weakened condition - a burdensome and expensive 5 2 two-step negotiation process before it can
implement the changes to the collective bargaining agreement
the debtor had already demonstrated were necessary to the reor'43

47 B.R. 835 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).

144 Id. at 842.

"45 52 B.R. 797 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985).
146 Id.

at 806.

147 Id.

148 Id.
149 155 B.R. 556 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993).
150 Id. at 13.

151 George, supra note 13, at 319-36; West, supra note 13, at 152-59; Berkman,
supra note 13, at 193.
152 In the Daily News's case, the rejection motion was litigated through three
levels of the court system in less than ninety days - an extraordinarily short period
of time. This intensive litigation was extremely expensive. Moreover, in addition
to the substantial legal expense involved, this legal battle consumed a significant
portion of the time of senior management.
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ganization.15 3 The only relief granted to the debtor is to enable
it to engage in negotiations with the union - which must then
continue until impasse - earlier than it otherwise could (i.e.,
upon expiration of the collective bargaining agreement pursuant
to its terms).
This result is also impossible to reconcile with a literal reading of § 1113. If the debtor cannot implement its final proposal
to the union immediately upon the union's rejection, it is hard to
understand § 11 13's concern that the debtor make a proposal
that is limited to necessary modifications. There is no reason for
any restrictions if the real agreement is to be determined by a
second round of negotiations. Indeed, if all that happens after
rejection is continued bargaining, the elaborate procedure created by § 1113 would seem to be much ado about nothing.
Adoption of this position would also lead to other difficulties. For example, would the bankruptcy court or the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) address alleged violations of this
duty to bargain? The bankruptcy court clearly lacks the expertise
to make such judgments. If the matter is placed in the hands of
the NLRB, as some commentators' 54 and courts' 55 have suggested, how is the NLRB's assertion of jurisdiction over a matter
integral to the reorganization process - as opposed to more
mundane violations of the NLRA, such as the allegedly unlawful
discharge of an individual employee - to be reconciled with the
153 The availability of emergency relief under § 1113(e) of the Bankruptcy Code
might arguably ameliorate any real harm to the debtor caused by imposing an obligation to bargain to impasse. Cf West, supra note 13, at 158 (suggesting that restrictions against post-rejection unilateral change may pressure debtors into
reaching interim changes under § 1113(e)). The problem with this argument, however, is that it ignores the more demanding standards for relief under § 1113(e)
than under § 1113(c). Specifically, § 1113(e) requires the debtor to demonstrate
that the relief sought is "essential to the continuation of the debtor's business, or in
order to avoid irreparable damage to the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(e).

George, supra note 13, at 334; West, supra note 13, at 159-61.
In re Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc., 899 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1990) (asserting
that "the bankruptcy court has no authority to adjudicate unfair labor practice
claims") (footnote omitted); NLRB v. Superior Forwarding, Inc., 762 F.2d 695, 700
(8th Cir. 1985) (positing that "if an unfair labor practice charge stems from a
debtor's failure to bargain in good faith over the terms and conditions of a new
contract, a bankruptcy court should deny a debtor's motion to enjoin Board proceedings on the charge"); NLRB v. Adams Delivery Serv. (In re Adams Delivery
Serv.), 24 B.R. 589, 592 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982) (finding that NLRB back pay proceeding not subject to removal to bankruptcy court). But see NLRB v. Goodman, 90
B.R. 56, 60 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (concluding that bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to
adjudicate alleged unfair labor practice where such issues are collateral to issues in
bankruptcy proceeding).
154
155
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bankruptcy concept that such matters are to be centralized in the
bankruptcy court? As a practical matter, sending the matter to
the NLRB could result in delays that would threaten the existence of the business.
4.

The Second Circuit's Resolution

Fortunately, the Second Circuit appears to have implicitly rejected this extreme approach in the MNI case. The Second Circuit conditioned its approval of the Debtor's rejection motion on
the Debtor and Zuckerman holding open their last proposal to
Local 6. Thus, no further bargaining would be necessary. On
the other hand, the debtor's ability to impose new terms after a
collective bargaining agreement has been rejected was flatly limited to the terms and conditions in the final proposal to the
union, even if that proposal was not only made after the § 1113
hearing, but while the bankruptcy court's decision was on appeal.
Unlike rejection of an ordinary executory contract pursuant to
§ 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor is not free - at least in
the Second Circuit - to impose any terms that it chooses after
rejection.
Although this decision is by no means as detrimental to the
reorganization process as would be the imposition of a duty to
bargain to impasse, it nonetheless is at odds with the spirit, if not
the letter, of § 1113. The entire thrust of § 1113 is to channel
the parties' effort towards negotiation, in the hope that they will
be able consensually to agree upon modifications to the collective bargaining agreement. By assuring the union that the
debtor's final proposal will either be held open as a condition of
rejection, or establish the ceiling on the changes which can be
implemented post-rejection, the union's incentive to compromise is substantially diminished, if not eliminated.
A sophisticated union will adopt the strategy of negotiating
with the debtor without actually agreeing to anything. At best, it
will convince the bankruptcy court that rejection is unwarranted
because the debtor has failed to establish one or more of the requirements under § 1113. At worst, it will be left with the
debtor's last proposal, with no risk that such proposal will be
withdrawn and less favorable terms imposed after rejection, 156 as
156 The debtor might frame its final proposal in terms of alternatives, depending
on whether a consensual agreement is reached or court ordered rejection is required, to defeat such a stratagem by a union. It is not clear, however, whether
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well as a potential claim for any damages" 7 resulting from rejection of the collective bargaining agreement. The rational decision for a union under such circumstances will be to roll the dice
rather than reach an agreement - it wins either way. Conversely, the rational debtor will be under substantial pressure to
give in to the union's demands, because the debtor - unlike the
union - faces the risk of getting nothing if it chooses to litigate.
5.

Future Solutions to the Post-Rejection Problem

The Second Circuit decision in MNI gives the union a true
bargaining advantage by requiring the Debtor to hold its last offer open as a condition to rejection. The last offer thus becomes
the new collective bargaining agreement. The authors submit
that this aspect of the ruling is not appropriate. Nothing in either
the Bankruptcy Code or the NLRA mandates this result. Section
1113 can be fairly construed as reconciling the conflicting policies of these two statutes in an altogether different way: the appropriate resolution under § 1113 is for the prior collective
bargaining agreement to be deemed terminated upon entry of a
rejection order. Under this circumstance, the Debtor will be free
to implement, without further bargaining, the proposal made to
the union as part of the § 1113 bargaining process. The debtor
could take this action without the worry of whether an "impasse"
under traditional NLRA analysis had been reached - frequently
a very difficult and imprecise determination. The bankruptcy
court ruling would satisfy or supersede the impasse requirement.
Instead of being locked into its last offer as mandated by MNI,
however, the debtor could engage in bargaining over other
changes from the terms and conditions of employment provided
by the rejected contract, to the extent required by the NLRA.
The former contract itself no longer would be an obstacle to
change, but the employer's section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain would
have to be satisfied.
The union's ability to strike, as well as the debtor's critical
need to avoid any major disruption to its business operations,
should in many cases serve as an effective disincentive to overreaching on the debtor's part post-rejection. At the same time,
the possibility that the debtor may implement changes less
such a proposal would comply with § 1113(b)(l)'s limitation that the proposal be
limited to necessary modifications.
157 See supra note 90 for a discussion of issues relating to potential damage claims
after rejection of a collective bargaining agreement.
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favorable to the union than the debtor's final proposal will truly
give the union an incentive to negotiate in good faith and attempt to reach an agreement.
Finally, because a substantial body of law exists under the
NLRA to deal with the expired contract situation, debtors and
unions will be able to determine their respective rights by reference to that set of legal principles and decisions.1 5 Such a result
would not offend the policies underlying the NLRA. These
polices have already been given their due weight in the procedural and substantive requirements for rejection contained in
§ 1113(b) and (c). By imposing a period of intense bargaining
before rejection can be ordered, § 1113 gives credence to the
spirit, if not the letter, of the NLRA. Under these circumstances
it is reasonable to conclude that Congress's silence on what happens after rejection means that the parties are subject only to the
rules that apply to the rejection of "normal" executory contracts,
particularly because this construction will make consensual modifications to collective bargaining agreements more likely.
V.

CONCLUSION

Section 1113 is a flawed statute. It has proved to be unworkable in practice and is the cause of much needless and expensive
litigation. A pervasive congressional overhaul is sorely needed.
Congress's original goal of encouraging the consensual
modification of burdensome collective bargaining agreements
and fostering the reorganization - as opposed to liquidation of financially troubled companies could be best met by eliminating the good cause element. In addition, we suggest strong consideration of the "final offer" arbitration model to deal with the
good cause problem. Finally, making clear that upon rejection
the debtor is free to implement any changes in the terms and
conditions of employment that it believes are necessary for its
reorganization, subject only to bargaining under the NLRA standards and to the relative economic bargaining power of the parties, will eliminate no-lose game playing by a union that would
occur as a result of the Second Circuit decision in the MNI case.
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